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The Marlboro Man's Secret versus the
Public Health:
Trade Secrets and Unconstitutional
Takings in PhiUip Morris v. Reilly*
by MELANIE TANG**
In Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly' (Phillip Morris III), the
Massachusetts district court held that a Massachusetts disclosure law
requiring manufacturers of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to
disclose the ingredients in those products constituted a taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The district court found that the
Massachusetts law violated the takings clause by taking trade secrets
for public use with no provision for, or reasonable prospect of, just
compensation. The district court also found that the Massachusetts
law violated Phillip Morris' Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights and that it violated the Commerce Clause. In issuing a
permanent injunction against the state, the Phillip Morris III court
published its own opinion, but also relied upon two prior holdings:
the district court's decision issuing a preliminary injunction in Phillip
Morris 1,2 and the First Circuit Court of Appeals decision upholding
the preliminary injunction in Phillip Morris ii.3 Although courts have
in the past found that trade secrets are property interests protected by
the Fifth Amendment, the Phillip Morris holdings are important for
* While this note was going to press, the appellate court reversed the district court
ruling. See 267 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001) (withdrawn from the bound volume). However, this
discussion remains instructive and relevant for the developing field of Fifth Amendment
takings jurisprudence.
** J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002. M.T.S.,
Harvard Divinity School, 1999. B.A. and B.S., Boston University, 1993. Thanks to
Professor Brian Gray and William Pickel.
1. 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
2. See Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21012 (D. Mass.
Dec. 10, 1997).
3. See Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998).
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two reasons. First, they present a significant, if coherent, departure
from established takings precedent and, second, in doing so, set a
precedent for successful corporate regulatory takings challenges to
"right-to-know," public welfare and safety laws.
This note will first introduce the Disclosure Act and the
procedural history of this multiple-suit battle between the tobacco
manufacturers and the state of Massachusetts in the courts. The rest
of this note will discuss the ways in which the Phillip Morris cases
depart from established takings law-especially that of the most
relevant Supreme Court precedent, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto4-and
the public policy implications of those departures. Part I will consider
Phillip Morris' novel interpretation of one of the most-often
discussed criteria courts have considered in takings claims: a private
property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations. Part II
will focus upon the court's analysis of the character of the state's
action in light of the "essential nexus" and "roughly proportionate"
standards promulgated in Nollan v. California Coastal Commn'n s and
Dolan v. City of Tigard, especially with respect to the courts' contrast
between the benefit / burden scheme imposed in Ruckelshaus with
the one imposed by the Massachusetts Disclosure Act.
Introduction: The Disclosure Act and Procedural History
On August 2, 1996, Massachusetts enacted the Disclosure Act,
which required cigarette and smokeless tobacco manufacturers to
disclose the additives and nicotine-yield ratings of their particular
products to the state's public health department.7 Most significantly,
4. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
5. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
6. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
7. The Disclosure Act provides as follows:
For the purpose of protecting the public health, any manufacturer of cigarettes,
snuff or chewing tobacco sold in the commonwealth shall provide the department
of public health with an annual report, in a form and at a time specified by that
department, which lists for each brand of such product sold the following
information:
(a) The identity of any added constituent other than tobacco, water or
reconstituted tobacco sheet made wholly from tobacco, to be listed in descending
order according to weight, measure or numerical count; and
(b) The nicotine yield ratings, which shall accurately predict nicotine intake for
average consumers, based on standards to be established by the department of
public health.
The nicotine yield ratings so provided, and any other such information in the
annual reports with respect to which the department determines that there is a
reasonable scientific basis for concluding that the availability of such information
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the statute provided that this information, which included the listing
of all ingredients in cigarettes besides tobacco, water, and
reconstituted tobacco sheet in descending order of weight or
measures, could become part of the public record if the Department
of Public Health determined that there was a "reasonable scientific
basis for concluding that the availability of such information could
reduce risks to public health,"8 and the Attorney General determined
that the publication of such information "would not constitute an
unconstitutional taking."9  The Disclosure Act was, and remains,
unprecedented tobacco regulation. Under the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), cigarette manufacturers are
required to file with the United States Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) a general list of additives to all tobacco
products.10 However, the list is not brand-specific, does not contain
information on the quantities of ingredients, and the DHHS is
prohibited from publicly releasing the information.1 Only two states,
Minnesota and Texas, have additional state law disclosure
could reduce risks to public health, shall be public records; provided, however,
that before any public disclosure of such information the department shall
request the advice of the attorney general whether such disclosure would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of property, and shall not disclose such
information unless and until the attorney general advises that such disclosure
would not constitute an unconstitutional taking.
This section shall not require a manufacturer, in its report to the department or
otherwise, to identify or disclose the specific amount of any ingredient that has
been approved by the Food and Drug Administration, Public Health Service,
United States Department of Health and Human Services ("FDA"), or its
successor agency, as safe when burned and inhaled or that has been designated
by the FDA, or its successor agency, as generally recognized as safe when burned
and inhaled, according to the Generally Recognized as Safe list of the FDA.
MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 94, § 307(B) (Law. Co-op. 2000) (emphasis added).
8. Id.
9. id.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 1335(a) (1994).
11. Frank Phillips, Cigarette Disclosure Measure Passes; Law Forcing List of
Ingredients Would be the First in the Nation, BOSTON GLOBE, July 25,1996, at Al.
Cigarette manufacturers typically comply with the FCLAA through an elaborate process:
[T]hey submit information to a law firm which acts as a clearinghouse for the
industry. The law firm then furnishes an annual list of all ingredients used by any
of the companies to the Secretary. The law firm maintains the secrecy of the
ingredients used in a particular brand from both the government and the brand's
competitors.
Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670, 672 (1st Cir. 1998). Furthermore, the
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health and Education Act, which governs
manufacturers of smokeless tobacco, 15 U.S.C. § 4403 (1994), is essentially the same as the
FCLAA, both in respect to its requirements and the way in which compliance is reached.
Id. at 672 n.2.
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requirements beyond those of the FCLAA, but they are significantly
more limited in scope than the Massachusetts law. The Minnesota
statute requires the disclosure of only a select list of additives in
tobacco products - ammonia, arsenic, cadmium, formaldehyde, and
lead." Texas law requires a disclosure process essentially identical to
the Disclosure Act, except that it has an additional provision:
information which "would be excepted from public disclosure as a
trade secret under state or federal law" is kept confidential. 3
The day the Disclosure Act went into effect, cigarette and
smokeless tobacco manufacturers Phillip Morris, R.J. Reynolds,
Brown & Williamson, United States Tobacco, Conwood, National
Tobacco, Pinkerton Tobacco, Swisher International, and Lorillard
sued the Massachusetts Attorney General in district court, claiming
that the FCLAA and the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Act
preempted the Massachusetts law. 4 After losing their initial motion
for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs went on to lose in court
twice more on the preemption issue. 5
The plaintiffs filed suit a fourth time. But this time, they sued for
declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that the
Disclosure Act was unconstitutional in three respects: the Act denied
the tobacco companies procedural due process in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment; the Act placed an undue burden upon
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause: and the
Act required public disclosure of trade secrets which amounted to a
taking of property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 6 A preliminary injunction was granted by the district
court,'7 and upheld by the First Circuit Court of Appeals."
Subsequently, the district court issued a permanent injunction against
Massachusetts, 9 preventing the state from implementing the
Disclosure Act. The permanent injunction was based primarily upon
12. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 461.17 (West 2000)
13. TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.354(d) (Vernon 2000). Sce generally
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 161.352 - 354 (Vernon 2000).
14. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2091 (D. Mass. Feb. 7,
1997).
15. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 957 F. Supp. 327 (D. Mass. 1997); Phillip
Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997).
16. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21012, at *3-4 (D.
Mass. Dec. 10, 1997).
17. Id.
18. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670 (1st Cir. 1998).
19. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
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the district court's finding that the Disclosure Act effectuated an
unconstitutional taking of private property.
Part I: Regulatory Takings and Reasonable Investment-
Backed Expectations
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
private property rights: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation."'  Despite this
absolutist proclamation, the idea that private property owners may do
anything they wish whatsoever with their property has always been
something of a myth. As James W. Ely, Jr. notes, private property
rights have always been subject to common-law restrictions such as
nuisance; community customs; as well as governmental controls such
as taxation, eminent domain, and governmental regulation.2' Richard
Epstein has described "the government's efforts to regulate the
possession, use, and disposition of private property"' as "a perfectly
commonplace affair in modern American life."' Such commonplace
regulations may affect land use, public health and welfare, or
commercial transactions. In the context of private industry,
regulations may impose a variety of controls-they may limit whom a
business may sell its product to, or limit the hours it may operate.
This is not to say that such regulations are welcomed: as one author
has observed, "when government regulates private property under
the police power, tensions tend to get particularly hot because it does
not generally pay for the privilege."'2 The takings clause, then, offers
protections for private property owners, requiring that individuals be
compensated when governmental infringement of property rights go
too far. However, this proposition is far more easily stated than
explained. Whether a regulation goes too far will, of course, have
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The appropriateness of the legal status of corporations as
fictional persons which enjoy constitutional protections, established in Santa Clara County
v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, 118 U.S. 394 (1886), is a subject which, though
beyond the scope of this note, merits serious consideration, especially when one considers
the ability of multinational corporations to bring (and win) takings challenges such as this
one.
21. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT. A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (1998).
22. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 100-01 (1998).
23. d at 101.
24. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER, ROBERT H. ABRAMS, WILLIAM GOLDFARB & ROBERT
L. GRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCIETY (1998).
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much to do with whom you ask. And there exists little black-letter
law to offer concrete guidance on the subject: "[T]he Supreme Court
has done little to clarify when a regulation crosses the critical line to
become a taking."'  Not surprisingly, at least one scholar has
described takings law as "convoluted and often incoherent. ' '
Despite the Supreme Court's identification of two categories of per se
takings - "physical invasions of private property, ' and situations
involving "the destruction of all economically beneficial use of the
property, where the regulated activity was not a nuisance-like activity
prohibited or constrained at common law"' - takings jurisprudence
remains a highly fact-dependent, case-by-case analysis, "guided by
notions of justice and fairness,"29 as well as considerations of factors
such as reasonable investment-backed expectations, the character of
the governmental action, and the nature of the state interests served.
A. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations in Penn Central v.
New York City: Remaining Value and the Whole Parcel Theory
As noted above, the property owner's reasonable investment-
backed expectation is a key factor in determining whether a
regulation "goes too far."'  Where a governmental action interferes
too dramatically with a reasonable investment-backed expectation, a
court may find that such action is an unconstitutional deprivation of
private property.
The origin of the "reasonable investment-backed expectation"
criteria in takings cases may be traced to PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robins, where the Supreme Court described takings analysis as a
comprehensive consideration of "the character of the governmental
action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable,
investment-backed expectations.",31 In Penn Central Transportation
25. Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS.
L. J. 527,530 (Spring 2000).
26. Id. at 533.
27. Id. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435-
36 (1982).
28. Id. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30
(1992).
29. Oswald, supra note 25, at 532.
30. See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that "while property
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking").
31. Pruneyard Shipping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (finding that the owner
of a shopping center had. no reasonable investment-backed expectation to exclude
individuals who were passing petitions on the premises, and held that allowing the
[Vol. 28:
Co. v. New York City, the Court laid out a framework for analyzing
takings claims and reasonable investment-backed expectations,
considering primarily the remaining value of the regulated private
property in determining whether the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the property owner had been satisfied.' The Penn
Central plaintiffs were a real estate developer and Penn Central Co.,
the owner of Penn Central Terminal in Manhattan, which claimed
that the city's refusal, based on historic preservation and aesthetic
reasons, to allow the construction of a multistory office building over
the terminal amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private
property for public benefit. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
promulgated a multifactor, case-by-case balancing test for analyzing
claims of regulatory takings. This "ad hoc, factual" inquiry
considered the economic impact of the governmental action upon the
claimant, "and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation
interfered with the distinct investment-based expectations."33
After consideration of the city's landmarks law and the
designation of Penn Central as a historic landmark, the Court found
that the economic impact of the law did not interfere significantly
with appellants' reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Although a certain amount of future profit had been precluded by the
regulation, the remaining value of the property, which included its
current use, was unaffected by the regulation:
[T]he New York City law does not interfere in any way with the
present uses of the Terminal. Its designation as a landmark not
only permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to
use the property precisely as it has been used for the past 65
years.... So the law does not interfere with what must be
regarded as Penn Central's primary expectation concerning use
of the parcel. More importantly, on this record, we must regard
the New York City law as permitting Penn Central not only to
profit from the Terminal, but also to obtain a reasonable return
on its investment.3
The Court also rejected appellants' contention that the relevant
inquiry with respect to reasonable investment-backed expectations
was the effect of the regulation solely upon the contested airspace
above the terminal, the discrete portion of the property affected by
petitioning would not "unreasonably impair the value or use of the property as a shopping
center").
32. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,123-28 (1978).
33. Id. at 124.
34. IL at 136.
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the regulation:
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into
discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated.... [T]his
Court focuses rather both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole- here, the city block designated as the
"landmark site."
35
This analysis promulgated by the Court has come to be known as
the "whole parcel" test in takings jurisprudence, and prohibits
conceptual divisibility in consideration of reductions in value of
private property. 6
B. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations in Andrus v. Allard:
Commercial Transactions and the "Whole Bundle" Theory
In Andrus v. Allard, the Court considered reasonable
investment-backed expectations with respect to personal, as opposed
to real, property and upheld a regulation prohibiting the sale or
transfer of personal property.37 Two individuals were prosecuted for
violating the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Eagle Protection Act
after they sold Indian artifacts partially composed of feathers of birds
protected under the Acts. The merchants contended that if the Acts
applied to "pre-existing" artifacts, which had been obtained before
the passage of the Acts, the Acts effectuated an unconstitutional
taking.' The Court rejected the merchants' takings claim, despite its
acknowledgment that "the timing of acquisition of the artifacts is
relevant to a takings analysis of appellees' investment-backed
expectations."39  The Court applied a "whole parcel" analysis,
focusing not upon the physical indivisibility of the property, but
instead upon the aggregate property rights conferred upon the
individuals owning the artifacts: "where an owner possesses a full
'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the
bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its
entirety. ' 4" As such, the Court reasoned that, "the denial of one
property right does not always amount to a taking., 41 Although the
35. Id- at 130-31.
36. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,497 (1987).
37. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67 (1979).
38. Id. at 54-55.
39. Id. at 64 n.21.
40. IM. at 65-66.
41. Id. at 65.
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Court recognized that the merchants had been precluded from the
most profitable use their property; 2 it noted that, "when we review
regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily
equated with a taking."'43 Instead, the Court considered what the
plaintiffs could do with the artifacts in light of the Acts:
[I]t is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic
benefit from the artifacts; for example they might exhibit the
artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future
profits- unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-
provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim.
Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned
speculation that courts are not especially competent to
perform.4
Like the Penn Central Court before it, the Allard Court took into
consideration the fact that defendants had not been denied all
economically viable use of their property, and specifically rejected the
loss of potential future profits as a basis for finding an
unconstitutional taking.
C. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations in Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto: Trade Secrets and Express Guarantees
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Supreme Court held that
trade secrets recognized as property under state law enjoy Fifth
Amendment protections from governmental takings, but reasonable
investment-backed expectations must be based upon explicit
promises to maintain the secrecy of those trade secrets.5 The
plaintiff, pesticide manufacturer Monsanto, challenged disclosure
provisions of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA) on the grounds that they effectuated a taking. FIFRA
requires that all pesticides sold in this country be registered with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). As part of the registration
process, pesticide manufacturers are required to provide the EPA
with information about the ingredients, as well as the health and
safety effects of the pesticides. Before 1972, FIFRA contained no
provisions regarding whether data submitted to the EPA under
FIFRA would be kept secret.46 In 1972, FIFRA was amended so that
the EPA was prohibited from disclosing publicly submitted data that
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id. at 65.
44. IL at 66.
45. 467 U.S. at 1005.
46. Id. at 1010.
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both the applicant/submitter and the EPA determined to be trade
secrets.' In 1978, additional amendments to FIFRA provided for the
"disclosure of all health, safety, and environmental data to qualified
requesters, notwithstanding the prohibition against disclosure of trade
secrets."'  Details about the manufacturing and quality control of
pesticides, and the ingredients of pesticides, could not be disclosed
unless the Administrator determined that the disclosure was
"necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health
or the environment." '49 Monsanto subsequently sued the EPA,
contending that FIFRA's data-disclosure provisions amounted to an
unconstitutional taking of trade secret property without
compensation."0
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun first addressed the
issue of the nature of Monsanto's property rights in its trade secrets.
Recognizing that "[t]rade secrets have many of the characteristics of
more tangible forms of property,""1 the Court concluded that to the
extent Monsanto had a trade secret property right recognizable under
state law, it had a property right protected by the taking clause of the
Fifth Amendment. 2
First, the Court found that with respect to all data submitted to
FIFRA after the effective date of the 1978 amendments, there could
be no taking because Monsanto submitted that data cognizant of the
new terms of FIFRA allowing the EPA to disclose submitted data
under certain circumstances. 3
Second, the Court held that Monsanto could not claim that data
submitted before 1972 had been unconstitutionally taken. Prior to
1972, the Court concluded that while FIFRA did not give the EPA
authority to disclose data obtained from pesticide manufacturers,
FIFRA also did not prohibit the EPA from disclosing data. With
respect to the pre-1972 period, the Court observed that the Federal
47. Id. at 1011-1012.
48. Id. at 995-996.
49. Id. at 996 (quoting FIFRA § 10(d)(1)(c)(1978)).
50. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 999 (1984).
51. Id. at 1002. The Court reasoned:
A trade secret is assignable. A trade secret can form the res of a trust, and it
passes to a trustee in bankruptcy. Even the manner in which Congress referred
to trade secrets in the legislative history of FIFRA supports the general
perception of their property-like nature.... Congress recognized that data
developers like Monsanto have a "proprietary interest" in their data.
52. Id. at 1004.
53. Id at 1006.
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Trade Secrets Act, a criminal statute punishing government
employees who disclose trade secrets acquired through their official
duties, could be relevant.' 4 However, the Court rejected the Trade
Secrets Act as a basis upon which Monsanto could have reasonably
relied for the same reasons that it found that the pre-1972 FIFRA
could not be reasonably relied upon: the "Trade Secrets Act is not a
guarantee of confidentiality to submitters of data, and absent an
express promise, Monsanto had no reasonable investment-backed
expectation that its information would remain inviolate in the hands
of EPA."55
Third, the court considered data submitted after the 1972
amendments but before the 1978 amendments. Here, Monsanto had
a legitimate takings claim against the EPA because of the existence of
an express promise to keep the data confidential." This promise,
absent from the pre-1972 and post-1978 periods, was an "explicit
governmental guarantee" which formed the basis of a reasonable
investment-backed expectation. If EPA, consistent with the... 1978
FIFRA amendments, were now to disclose trade-secret data or
consider those data in evaluating the application of a subsequent
applicant in a manner not authorized by the version of FIFRA in
effect between 1972 and 1978, EPA's actions would frustrate
Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectation with respect
to its control over the use and dissemination of the data it had
submitted.*"
The Court observed that the right to exclude others was
considered one of the "most essential sticks in the bundle of rights
that are commonly characterized as property,"58 and that this right to
exclude takes on particular significance when trade secrets are
54. Id. The Act provides for fines, imprisonment, and firing of any federal employee
who:
publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or to any extent
not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course of his
employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation
made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or
agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to
the trade secret, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the
identity, confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits,
losses, or expenditures of any person, firm, partnership corporation, or
association.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2000).
55. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1008.
56. Id. at 1011.
57. Id. at 1011.
58. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).
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involved, because once trade secrets are disclosed to others "the
holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data."5
Accordingly, the Court found that an analysis of remaining economic
value in trade secrets cases was not appropriate:
[T]hat the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they
are disclosed - for example, as bases from which to develop new
products or refine old products, as marketing and advertising
tools, or as information necessary to obtain registration in
foreign countries - is irrelevant to the determination of the
economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property
rightf.'
Recognizing the unique nature of property interests in trade
secrets, where an explicit governmental guarantee provides the basis
of a reasonable investment-backed expectation, the Ruckelshaus
Court pointedly departed from the Penn Central and Allard "whole
parcel" theory of property rights.
D. Phillip Morris:. Expectations Redefined
In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court in Phillip
Morris I cited Ruckelshaus in its discussion of reasonable investment-
backed expectations, and the unique, per se nature of trade secrets in
takings analysis.6 In concluding that the Disclosure Act violated the
plaintiffs' reasonable investment-backed expectations, the court cited
facts asserted by the plaintiffs and uncontested by the state:
The record . . . supports [plaintiffs'] claims to have made
substantial investments in the development of the "flavor
recipes" which they say are their secrets. See Houghton Aft. P
12; Oelschlager Aft. P 12. The record also supports the claim
that there would be a substantial loss of competitive advantage
if the secrets were revealed. See Houghton Aft. P6; Ingram Aft
P 6-7. Where those factors exist, Ruckelshaus instructs that
trade secrets may not be taken - that is destroyed - without
compensation.62
Phillip Morris II concluded that the lower court was correct in
its determination that the plaintiffs possessed the "requisite
expectations to support a takings claim."' However, unlike the lower
court, the appellate court engaged in a more detailed discussion of
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1012.
61. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 1997 U.S. LEXIS 21012, at *17 (D. Mass. Dec.
10,1997).
62. Id. at *18.
63. Id. at *14.
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Ruckelshaus. After recounting the three-part Ruckelshaus decision in
some detail, the appellate court ultimately concluded that
Massachusetts statutory and common law based protections for trade
secrets made Ruckelshaus's 1972-78 period "the closest, most
persuasive analogy to the situation created by""M the Disclosure Act.
The court reasoned that the statutory and common law protections
"in effect provided specific protections for trade secret information"'65
so explicit that they were akin to the FIFRA's 1972 provisions
guaranteeing that designated trade secrets would be protected from
disclosure. In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court rejected
the state's contention that the statutory and common law trade secret
protections made the present situation analogous to the pre-1972 time
period in Ruckelshaus, due to the lack of affirmative assurances of
nondisclosure of submitted information contained in those doctrines.
In a section of its opinion entitled "The Marlboro Man's Secret," the
appellate court described the tobacco companies' "recipes" as
extraordinarily financially valuable.66 In support of this proposition,
the appellate court cited a Financial World article,67 as well as
plaintiffs' claims:
The tobacco companies claim that the operation of Section
307B threatens to destroy these enormously valuable trade
secrets. The industry submits aggregate lists of all ingredients
included in tobacco products sold in the United States in
compliance with federal law .... [T]hese lists cannot feasibly
be used to copy a tobacco product's taste or aroma. Divulging
brand-specific lists of ingredients in descending order of
64. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670,677 (1st Cir. 1998).
65. Id. The court cited MAss. ANN. LAWS. Ch. 93 §§ 42 and 42A (West 2000), and
Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 466 N.E.2d 138, 139-40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984).
Section 42 deals with Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, and states in relevant part:
Whoever embezzles, steals or unlawfully takes, carries away, conceals or copies,
by fraud or by deception obtains, from any person or corporation, with intent to
convert to his own use, any trade secret, regardless of value, shall be liable in tort
to such person or corporation for all damages resulting therefrom. Where or not
the case is tried by a jury, the court, in its discretion, may increase the damages
up to double the amount found.
Section 42A provides for injunctive relief for misappropriation of trade secrets. In Peggy
Lawton, the court found that the use of nut dust in chocolate chip cookies was a trade
secret, despite being a rather mundane substance. The court found that the nut dust
"served to add that modicum of originality which separates a process from the every day
and so characterizes a trade secret." Peggy Lawton, 466 N.E.2d at 139-40.
66. Phillip Morris, 151 F.3d at 673.
67. Id. See Kurt Badenausen, Blind Faith, FINANCIAL WORLD, July 8, 1996 at 50-65
(touting Phillip Morris's Marlboro brand "as worth over $44,000,000,000 and... the most
valuable of 364 brand names surveyed.").
Summer 20011
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
volume.., is quite a different story; the plaintiffs aver.., that
such lists, when and as disclosed will allow pirates to "reverse
engineer" products... with substantially reduced research and
development costs. The threat of this increased ease of entry
into, and competition within, the tobacco industry fuels the
plaintiffs' challenge.6
In issuing a permanent injunction, Phillip Morris III did not
engage in an extensive analysis of the plaintiffs' reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The court cited the plaintiffs'
depositions and relied upon the findings in the summary judgment
record before it, finding it "clear" that the plaintiffs "made substantial
investments in the development and protection of their brand-specific
ingredient information" and that the Disclosure Act would cause
plaintiffs to suffer "a substantial loss of competitive advantage."6 9
The Phillip Morris holdings regarding reasonable investment-
backed expectations are even more unprecedented than the
Disclosure Act itself. -Not surprisingly, all three opinions reject the
whole parcel analysis of Penn Central and Allard, and adopt the
Ruckelshaus Court's view that the property interest contained in a
trade secret is destroyed the moment it ceases to be secret. However,
the holdings fail to conform to the Ruckelshaus analysis regarding
express assurances against public disclosure. Although the
Ruckelshaus and Phillip Morris situations are different because the
former concerns amendments to an existing statute, while the latter
addresses the enactment of a new statute, the Ruckelshaus Court's
discussion of the Federal Trade Secrets Act shows that an affirmative
guarantee against disclosure may be located in statutory authority
outside of the contested statute, so long as it explicitly exists. Any
discussion of parallels between the Trade Secrets Act and
Massachusetts statutory and common law trade secret protections is
notably absent from any of the Phillip Morris opinions. Although the
Trade Secrets Act, the Massachusetts trade secret misappropriation
laws, and the holding of Peggy Lawton Kitchens all substantively
protect trade secrets, none offer the Ruckelshaus Court's "guarantee
of confidentiality to submitter of data" vis-h-vis regulatory agencies.
In fact, the Massachusetts misappropriation statute and Peggy
Lawton holding, having nothing to do with misappropriation of trade
secrets by government agency employees, are more general than the
Trade Secrets Act and offer even less of a basis upon which to assert
68. Phillip Morris, 159 F.3d at 673.
69. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129, 144 (D. Mass. 2000).
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affirmative trade secret protections vis-A-vis regulatory agencies.
The more significant aspect of the Phillip Morris holdings is not
the First Circuit's incomplete application of Ruckelshaus, however.
In determining that the plaintiffs had a reasonable investment-backed
expectation protected by the Fifth Amendment, the Phillip Morris
courts relied almost exclusively upon documents submitted by
plaintiffs asserting that their recipes were worth a great deal of
money, and that disclosure would cause them to lose a great deal of
money. Although it appears that the court-cited affidavits were not
factually challenged by the state of Massachusetts, such limited
analysis is not supported by Ruckelshaus, Penn Central, or Allard. In
Ruckelshaus, the Court acknowledged that pesticide companies made
significant financial investments in developing and marketing new
pesticides, noting in its opinion that development of new commercial
pesticides requires a development process of 14 to 22 years, the
expenditure of $5 to $15 million per year for several years, with the
result that Monsanto "successfully markets 1 out of every 10,000
chemicals tested."70  Although these factors confirmed the trade
secret value of pesticide formulas, they were not dispositive in
determining Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expectations.
In this respect, Monsanto's special consideration for trade secrets is
consistent with the whole parcel theory in Penn Central and Allard,
insofar as a reasonable investment-backed expectation is considered
within a larger context beyond the investor's monetary output and
declared interests. Monsanto considered not just the company's
investments in the development of trade secrets, but also the
circumstances under which the data had been submitted to the EPA;
Penn Central considered not just the inability to build additional
office space, but also the ability for the terminal to continue operating
in its current capacity; and Allard considered the merchants' ability to
retain their artifacts, even though they could no longer sell them.
Furthermore, the Penn Central and Allard Courts declined to include
calculations of future profits precluded by newly imposed regulations,
with the Allard Court commenting that "loss of future profits-
unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-provides a
slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. '71 Similarly, the
Monsanto Court commented that a "reasonable investment-backed
70. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 998 (1984) (citing Monsanto v. Acting
Administrator, United States EPA, 564 F. Supp. 552,555 (E.D. Mo. 1983)).
71. See Penn Central v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,130 (1978); Andrus v. Allard,
444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
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expectation must be more than a unilateral expectation or an abstract
need." In Ruckelshaus, Penn Central, and Allard, reasonable
investment-backed expectations of private property owners are
defined in terms of the interplay between private property interests
and governmental actions, with the operating background
assumptions that the state has the power to regulate and limit private
property rights and that a monetary loss alone is not enough to
support a takings claim. This is why other considerations are taken
into account: the degree to which the regulation alters the previous
conditions and the amount of the property that remains unfettered by
the regulation. It is also fair to say that implicit in those cases is a
presumption of the constitutionality of regulation and law, with courts
giving lawmakers the discretion to regulate in the public interest.
In Phillip Morris, the locus of the inquiry into a private property
owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations is profoundly
transformed: it does not involve a consideration of the interplay
between property owner regulation, or any other attempt (save the
appellate court's quote from Financial World) by the courts to
independently discern facts or consider the possible consequences of
the Disclosure Act. Rather, the courts simply considered the actions
taken and money invested by the tobacco companies, and the
companies' self-serving descriptions of the dangers of reverse
engineering, with the ultimate result that all three courts agreed that
the industry's own predictions of a large monetary loss were such that
the Act would surely violate the companies' reasonable investment-
backed expectations. In addition to the obvious fox-guarding-the-
henhouse problem of allowing expectations to be "unilaterally
defined" by private property owners who are likely to be the most
ardent opponents of the law or regulation, the Phillip Morris holdings
effectively jettison the need for courts to consider any factors except
for the financial output and potential profits of the private property
owner which, in the case of huge industries like tobacco, may easily
reach into the millions of dollars. Robert K. Hur has suggested that
the Phillip Morris plaintiffs misrepresented their interests in the
Disclosure Act litigation, "persuading the... courts to accept its [sic]
apocalyptic picture of the magnitude of interests at stake and the
grave danger posed to those interests."'73 Specifically, Hur argues that
72. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1005 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155,161 (1980)).
73. Robert K. Hur, Takings, Trade Secrets, and Tobacco: Mountain or Molehill?, 53
STAN L. Rv. 447, 472, 483 (2000). To be entirely fair, it is worth noting that Hur also
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tobacco products can already be reverse engineered using processes
such as chromatographic and mass spectral analyses, and that such
practices are entirely acceptable;74 that the "oligopolistic nature" of
the tobacco industry renders the plaintiffs' concerns about upstart
competitors stealing their business minimal, if not disingenuous;75 that
"tobacco titans" would not face "significant threats from each other if
their ingredient lists were disclosed" because they are motivated to
make their products unique, not similar;76 and that tobacco companies
have successfully dealt with disclosure laws in the past in Canada.'
Hur's contentions emphasize the Phillip Morris courts' failure to
engage in any significant independent fact-finding, simply accepting
the tobacco companies' claims at face value without so much as an
expression of skepticism.
The impressive numbers quoted by the Phillip Morris plaintiffs
also raise the question of bias in favor of large, rich plaintiffs in
takings cases. The Phillip Morris holdings suggest that the more
money a plaintiff invests in a private property interest like a trade
secret, the more likely it is that the plaintiff's takings claim will be
successful. This contravenes the very idea of a reasonable
investment-backed expectation, which should be considered in
relative, not absolute, terms. Furthermore, questions of fundamental
fairness exist in situations like Phillip Morris, involving a large,
influential, corporate industry like tobacco, where the aggrieved
plaintiff is likely to already enjoy representation and influence in
political and legislative processes.
Part H. The Character of the Governmental Action
A. The Price of Living in a Civilized Society: Penn Central and Allard
In applying Penn Central's ad-hoc, multifactor test, Justice
Brennan also discussed the "character" of the governmental action,
noting that governmental actions constituting physical invasions upon
describes the Disclosure Act as "unconstitutional harassment of an industry, a legislative
'window-breaking' of sorts."
74. I at 483.
75. Id at 487. Hur writes: "Four companies... sell ninety-eight percent of the 450
million packs of cigarettes purchased annually in Massachusetts, dominating the $1.2
billion state market. The market share figure holds roughly true for the national market
as well. (citations omitted)."
76. Id at 487.
77. Id. at 488. Hur writes, "[T]obacco companies have shown that where they have a
will to sell their products, they can find a way to do so."
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private property are more likely to be considered unconstitutional
takings,78 as opposed to interference with private property rights in a
regulatory context, "aris[ing] from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good."7 Accordingly, Justice Brennan cited the Court's upholding of
"land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected recognized
real property interests"' ° in the context of zoning laws. Justice
Brennan also discussed the nuisance exception to the takings clause,
or harm/benefit test, generally understood to be the idea that private
property rights are always subject to governmental regulation for the
purpose of promoting a public interest, and that a diminution in value
of private property due to such governmental regulation is not a
taking.'
In rejecting appellants' argument that they had suffered a taking,
the Penn Central majority validated the state's broad power to
regulate private property:
Stated baldly, appellants' position appears to be that the only
means of ensuring that selected owners are not singled out to
-endure financial hardship for no reason is to hold that any
restriction imposed on individual landmarks pursuant to the
New York City scheme is a 'taking' requiring the payment of
'just compensation.' Agreement with this argument would, of
course, invalidate not just New York City's law, but all
comparable landmark legislation in the Nation. We find no
78. Penn Central Transportation Co v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Most recently, the Supreme Court held in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 485 U.S. 419, 421 (1982), that a taking in the form of a physical occupation was
effectuated by a city ordinance requiring the owner of an apartment building to allow
installation of cable television connections in her building, even though the diminution of
property value was, to say the least, minimal.
79. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
80. Id. at 125.
81. Id at 125-27. Some of the more famous "nuisance exception" cases emphasize
the idea that private property owners always hold title subject to social and economic
changes which may necessitate a change in the laws affecting the nature of that private
property right. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), despite the fact that the passage
of a law prohibiting consumption and manufacture of alcohol had the effect of rendering
Mugler's formerly legal business illegal and worthless overnight, the Supreme Court held
that the Kansas legislature was within its authority in declaring alcohol to be a public
nuisance, and denied Mugler any compensation. In Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 404,
410 (1915). the operator of a brickyard had his land annexed by the rapidly-growving city of
Los Angeles, and suddenly found that the continued operation of his business violated
newly applicable municipal codes. The Court rejected the idea of Hadachek having a
"vested interest" in the value of his brickyard, noting that "[t]here must be progress, and if
in its march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of the
community."
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merit in it. 82
The Allard Court also implicated the nuisance exception in its
decision upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty and Eagle Protection
Acts, drawing upon prohibition-era cases to illustrate the extent to
which commercial transactions may be regulated: "Regulations that
bar trade in certain goods have been upheld against claims of
unconstitutional taking."'  The Court deferred to the power and
judgment of the state to impose regulations, even severe ones.
Although the Allard merchants would "bear the costs" of the Acts, 84
the Court held that "within limits, that is a burden bore to secure the
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community." s In
Penn Central and Allard, the Supreme Court generally validated the
state's power to impose regulations governing a broad spectrum of
civic life, from land use and zoning to commercial transactions.
B. The Essential Nexus and Roughly Proportional Standards, and
Wipeouts: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, Dolan v. City
of Tigard, and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Supreme Court
held that a zoning law was unconstitutional because it did not
"substantially advance legitimate state interests."8  The Coastal
Commission had denied the Nollans, owners of a 1/10th acre lot,
permission to expand their cabin into a larger home unless they
agreed to an easement to allow public foot traffic to walk across the
Nollans' property. The Court found that the easement did not serve
the Commission's proffered reasons for imposing it-protecting the
public's ability to see the public beach, thereby "assisting the public in
overcoming the psychological barrier to using the beach created by a
developed oceanfront, and preventing congestion on the public
beaches."'  The Court found no "essential nexus" between the
"condition and the original purpose of the building restriction,"' and
characterized the Commission's true objective as an attempt to obtain
82. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
83. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979).
84. Id at 67. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,422 (1992)).
85. Allard, 444 U.S. at 67.
86. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (quoting Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225,261 (1980)).
87. Id. at 835.
88. Id. at 837.
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a free easement.Y In a footnote, Justice Scalia distinguished
Ruckelshaus from the case at hand by considering the nature of the
benefit conferred:
[T]he right to build on one's own property even though its
exercise can be subject to legitimate permitting requirements
cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit.' And
thus the announcement that the application (or granting of) the
permit will entail the yielding of a property interest cannot be
regarded as establishing the voluntary 'exchange,' 467 U.S. at
1007, that we found to have occurred in Ruckelshaus.0
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,9' the Supreme Court subjected state
actions to even more scrutiny by adding a second criterion to the
Nollan "essential nexus" testy. In Dolan, a shop owner was granted a
city permit to expand her store upon the condition that she dedicate
portions of her land to the city as a greenbelt to minimize flooding,
and as a pedestrian / bicycle pathway in the interests of relieving
traffic congestion.' Under Nollan, the city's exaction was
constitutional because an "essential nexus" existed: the prevention of
flooding and reduction of traffic congestion were legitimate public
purposes, and the Court noted that "it seems equally obvious that a
nexus exists" between preventing flooding and limiting development
in the flood plain.94 However, the Dolan Court imposed a second tier
of analysis through the creation of a "rough proportionality"
standard, and required the city to "make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both in nature
and extent to the impact of the proposed development."' 5 The city's
exaction failed this test: the Court found that there had been no
explanation as to why the flood plain had to be a public, not private,
easement.96 The Court also rejected as too vague the city's claim that
the pathway "could" decrease traffic congestion occasioned by the
expansion of the store, describing it as "a far cry from a finding that
the bicycle pathway system will, or is likely to, offset some of the
traffic demand."' Consequently, the Court found that the exaction of
89. Id.
90. Id. at 834 n.2.
91. 512 U.S. at 391.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 387 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836).
95. Id. at 391.
96. Id at 393.
97. Id at 395 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 317 Or. 110, 127 (1993)).
[Vol. 28:
THE MARLBORO MAN'S SECRET
Dolan's property was not roughly proportionate to the city's
ostensible rationale.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Court found that
a man who had been prevented from building upon two residential
lots by legislation passed two years after he purchased those lots
suffered an unlawful taking of private property." Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia held that the South Carolina law removed all
value from Lucas's two parcels of land, and that, consequently, Lucas
was entitled to compensation: "[W]hen the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the
name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking."99 Lucas has come to stand for the
proposition that where a regulation "denies all economically
beneficial or productive use of land," or causes a wipeout, a per
se taking has occurred."
In Nollan, Dolan, and Lucas, the Supreme Court began applying
a higher level of scrutiny to the use of police power in ways which
impact private property interests, especially with respect to land use
and zoning actions.
C. Ruckelshaus, Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, and National
Fertilizer Co. v. Bradley: Voluntary Exchanges, Benefits, and Public
Disclosure
In Ruckelshaus, the plaintiffs argued that FIFRA's provisions
were an unconstitutional condition on the right to the "valuable
Government benefit" '' of registration. The Court rejected this
argument, finding FIFRA's provisions to be well within the bounds of
the federal government's power to market and regulate pesticides.
Having made this determination, the Court found that any further
analysis as to whether the burden of registration was a fair tradeoff
was not a matter of constitutional significance, but an internal
business decision:
Because the market for Monsanto's pesticide products is an
international one, Monsanto could decide to forgo registration
in the United States and sell a pesticide only in foreign markets.
Presumably it will do so in those situations where it deems the
data to be protected from disclosure more valuable than the
98. 505 U.S. 1003,1012-13 (1992).
99. Id at 1019.
100. Id. at 1015.
101. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986,1006 (1984).
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right to sell in the United States. 2
The Court pointed to Monsanto's continuing research,
development and submission of new data to the EPA as proof that
the company was "willing to bear this burden in exchange for the
ability to market pesticides in this country." 1°' Therefore, the Court
concluded, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under
which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally
related to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission
of data by an applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a
registration can hardly be called a taking."
The Ruckelshaus Court also commented upon the social value of
disclosure requirements: "[P]ublic disclosure can provide an effective
check on the decision-making processes of EPA and allows members
of the public to determine the likelihood of individualized risk
peculiar to their use of the product."' 5  Consequently, the Court
reconciled its Fifth Amendment protection for trade secrets with the
validity of disclosure statutes by limiting the protection of the right to
exclude to a right enjoyed against competitors, not consumers:
We emphasize that the value of a trade secret lies in the
competitive advantage it gives its owner over its
competitors.... If... a public disclosure of data reveals, for
example, the harmful side effects of the submitter's product and
causes the submitter to suffer a decline in the potential profits
from sales of the product, that decline in profits stems from a
decrease in the value of the pesticide to consumers, rather than
from the destruction of an edge the submitter had over its
competitors, and cannot constitute the taking of a trade
secret.16
The Supreme Court's holding in Ruckelshaus was not
unprecedented in upholding the underlying policies behind public
disclosure, or "right-to-know" laws and regulations. In Corn
Products Refining Co v. Eddy,'O' a case cited and quoted in
Ruckelshaus, a corn syrup manufacturer challenged a Kansas statute
requiring labels to "state definitely the percentage of each
ingredient."" The Supreme Court rejected the manufacturer's
102. Id. at 1007 n. 11.
103. Id. at 1007.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1016.
106. Id. at 1011-12 n.15.
107. 249 U.S. 427 (1919). See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007-08.
108. Eddy, 249 U.S. at 430.
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challenge:
And it is too plain for argument that a manufacturer... has no
constitutional right to sell goods without giving to the purchaser
fair information of what it is that is being sold. The right of a
manufacturer to maintain secrecy as to his compounds and
processes must be held subject to the right of the state, in the
exercise of its police power and in promotion of fair dealing, to
require that the nature of the product be fairly set forth.'O
In National Fertilizer Ass'n, Inc. v. Bradley,"0 the Supreme Court
rejected another manufacturer's challenge to a state law requiring
disclosure of fertilizer ingredients, simply stating that "[i]n response
to the assertion that compliance with the... amendment would
require complainants to reveal secret formulas and thus unlawfully
deprive them of property... is enough to refer to [Eddy].'' The
Ruckelshaus Court's validation of the government's power to regulate
commercial products is consistent with the established principle that
disclosure laws serve important public welfare purposes.
D. Phillip Morris: Benefits, Burdens, and Vested Rights
The Phillip Morris courts expressed skepticism about both the
validity of the state's exercise of police power through the Disclosure
Act, and the effectiveness of the Act's two-step review process. In
Phillip Morris I, the court found that there was a "substantial
question" as to whether the disclosure of trade secrets was a "harm
disproportionate to the marginal benefit in increased public
awareness of the dangers of tobacco use that could be anticipated."".
In Phillip Morris III, the district court rejected Massachusetts'
contention that plaintiffs' claim was not ripe because no trade secrets
had actually been publicized yet."' The court found that the review
process, such that it was, was far too slanted toward disclosure."4 The
Attorney General's position on the subject, made evident throughout
the litigation, meant that he could not be expected to ever find that a
disclosure would effectuate a taking."'5 And the Department of Public
Health standard for disclosure was simply too low:
109. Id- at 431-32.
110. 301 U.S. 178 (1937).
111. I& at 182.
112. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. 96-11599GAO, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21012, at *16-17 (D. Mass. Dec. 10, 1997).
113. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129,138 (D. Mass. 2000).
114. Id. at 139.
115. Id. at 140.
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There is no reason to expect that the DPH would conclude, in
effect, that providing more information to consumers about the
ingredients of tobacco products could not reduce public health
risks. After all, the very premise of the statute is to the
contrary: manufacturers of tobacco products should be required
to disclose what is in their products so consumers may know
more about what they consume, and, presumably, think better
of it. It taxes credulity to think that the tobacco product
ingredient information would not be designated for public
disclosure under any good-faith application of the statutory
standard.116
The court predicted that while the Disclosure Act's "reasonable
scientific basis" standard "would be met by a minimal showing of
reliability," the standard for not publicizing the ingredient lists would
be virtually impossible to meet.
17
Phillip Morris 1X1 also characterized Massachusetts' contention
that the plaintiffs could avoid public disclosure altogether "simply by
withdrawing from sale in Massachusetts any product manufactured
using the secrets" as a misinterpretation of Ruckelshaus. 8 The court
found that, unlike the FIFRA regulatory scheme at issue in
Ruckelshaus, which offered both burdens and benefits to the pesticide
manufacturers, the Disclosure Act offered the tobacco manufacturers
only burdens. The ability to continue selling products in
Massachusetts could not be properly construed as a benefit, because
it was "not similar to the give-and-take exchange that the Court
approved in Ruckelshaus.""9
Phillip Morris II described Nollan, Dolan and Lucas as
"signposts" pointing "in a direction favoring the tobacco companies'
position," insofar as they suggested that courts "will demand
substantial, rather than nominal, compensation to legitimate
governmental takings."'"0 In rejecting the state's "isthmian focus on
Monsanto's treatment of the pre-1972 period," the court held that
Ruckelshaus had to be understood in terms of Dolan, with the
relevant inquiry being what plaintiffs would receive as compensation
or a benefit in exchange for giving up their property rights in their
trade secrets.12 ' The court described as "pellucid" Massachusetts'
116. Id at 147.
117. Id. at 139.
118. Id at 144.
119. Id
120. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670,678 (1st Cir. 1998).
121. Id. at 678.
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argument that the ability of the plaintiffs to continue doing business
in the state was a fair benefit conferred in exchange for the burden of
compliance:
The ability to conduct (and more especially, to continue to
conduct) a lawful business in Massachusetts, though subject to
some governmental requirements, simply is not analogous,
either in kind or in degree, to the benefit that effected the
exchange and extinguished the takings claim in Ruckelshaus.'
"
Drawing a parallel between the Nollans' right to use property
they owned in the manner they wished, and the tobacco companies'
right to continue engaging in a lawful business, the appellate court
characterized Massachusetts' attempt to implement the Disclosure
Act as working a legal compulsion, forcing plaintiffs to make a
"Hobson's choice" of losing essential trade secret protections or
withdrawing from the Massachusetts market." 3
Although not addressed in Phillip Morris III, Phillip Morris II's
discussion of Nollan and Dolan as "signposts" modifying the clear
terms of Ruckelshaus via a general pro-property rights policy shift
presents novel interpretations of Nollan and Dolan. There is, at the
outset, a colorable argument that the Dolan "rough proportionality"
standard is simply not applicable to regulatory takings cases such as
Phillip Morris. In its brief to the appellate court, Massachusetts cited
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., where the
Supreme Court held that "we have not extended the rough-
proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special context of
exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of development
on the dedication of property to public use."124 Such an interpretation
of Dolan could arguably also support the contention that Nollan is
similarly limited to land use cases."
Even if Dolan is understood as a clarification or explication of
Nollan with a broad application in takings jurisprudence, however,
the appellate court's use of Nollan and Dolan to address primarily the
issue of compensation paid to the private property owner ignores a
122 1& at 677.
123. Id- at 678-79.
124. 526 U.S. at 702. See also Brief for Appellant at 46, Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly,
113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000) (No. 96-11619) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. See
also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg., Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 772
n.11 (9th Cir. 2000) (relying upon City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 697,703 (1999), for the proposition that the NollaniDolan test is "inapposite
to regulatory takings cases outside the context of excessive exactions.").
125. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Environmental Defense et al. at 26, Phillip Morris, Inc.
v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2000).
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fundamental aspect of Nollan. In Nollan, what the Court required,
and what the coastal commission could not provide, was a nexus
between the governmental action and the governmental interest in
the action. Requiring a path next to the seawall on the Nollans'
property was not unconstitutional per se; rather, it was
unconstitutional because requiring the path was not rationally related
to the underlying purposes served by the exaction.126 The Phillip
Morris courts, however, do not address the issue of whether an
essential nexus exists between the Disclosure Act and Massachusetts'
interest in promoting public health. Instead, the appellate court
treats Nollan and Dolan as requiring compensation for those
adversely affected by governmental regulations, a position explicitly
rejected in Penn Central and Allard, as well Ruckelshaus, Eddy, and
National Fertilizer.
Furthermore, it is clear that the Disclosure Act would pass the
essential nexus test. Although the Disclosure Act was unprecedented
in its scope, the FCLAA, the Texas and Minnesota laws, Ruckelshaus,
Eddy, National Fertilizer, and common sense all support the
proposition that there is a rational relation between the disclosure of
ingredients contained in tobacco products and the state's interest in
promoting public health. Product labels are commonplace on
consumer goods ranging from painkillers to fertilizers to soda,
allowing consumers to make informed choices about what they buy
and consume based upon fat content, carcinogenic components, and
potential side effects. However, the most convincing evidence of an
essential nexus between the Act and promotion of public health may
be the district court's own characterization of the Disclosure Act as
too pro-disclosure. Describing the "premise" of the statute as
requiring disclosure of ingredients "so consumers may know more
about what they consume and, presumably, think better of it,"1" the
district court's criticism of the Act's two-part review standard proves
too much, more or less implicitly assuming the existence of an
essential nexus. Despite this concession, however, none of the Phillip
Morris courts discuss the application of the essential nexus test to the
Disclosure Act, thereby ignoring the primary focus of Nollan.
The Phillip Morris courts' efforts to distinguish the Disclosure
Act from FIFRA in Ruckelshaus by way of Nollan and the benefits
conferred by the governmental regulation is also unsupported by
relevant case law. In Phillip Morris II, the appellate court quoted
126. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,835-42 (1987).
127. Phillip Morris III, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 147.
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Justice Scalia's footnote in Nollan, distinguishing -"the ability to
improve one's own property" and the "type of government benefit
proffered in exchange for use and disclosure of trade secret
information in Ruckelshaus,"" in support of its conclusion that the
benefits received by the plaintiffs in Ruckelshaus could be
distinguished from the right to develop privately owned property in
Nollan.
Specifically, the appellate court found that the Ruckelshaus
plaintiffs had been granted affirmative benefits through registration,
whereas the Nollan plaintiffs had only gained the ability to do
something which they had a right to do in the first place: "Nollan
teaches that the mere granting of permission to engage in routine
activities, incident to existing property rights, does not afford
compensation sufficient to support a Ruckelshaus-type exchange.""1 9
In making this distinction, the Phillip Morris courts found that the
"opportunity to sell tobacco products ... is analogous to the right to
develop real property at issue in Nollan, but not to the benefit of an
EPA registration as in Ruckelshaus."'3°  This interpretation of
Ruckelshaus should be rejected for several reasons.
First, an examination of the types of benefits the Ruckelshaus
plaintiffs received for EPA registration and the potential benefits for
compliance with the Disclosure Act reveal that the Phillip Morris
courts' distinction between the two is unwarranted. The two schemes
provide the same basic benefit-the right to sell commercial products
to the public. The 1978 Amendments allowed the EPA to consider
the health and safety information submitted by one manufacturer in
the registration process for similar chemicals in applications by
different manufacturers after a ten-year period of exclusive use for
the original submitter, and provided for compensation to be paid to
the original submitter of data.13" ' However, under FIFRA's pre-1978
incarnation, information designated as a trade secret would never be
released to other manufacturers by the EPA. Presumably, if a
company wished to divulge its trade secrets during that period to
another manufacturer, it could have privately negotiated for
compensation. Indeed, the Phillip Morris courts appear to have
retroactively created compensatory benefits for the Ruckelshaus
plaintiffs that the Ruckelshaus Court itself had not contemplated. In
128. Phillip Morris, 159 F.3d at 677 (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.2).
129. Id.
130. Amicus Brief, supra note 125, at 22.
131. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 994-995 (1984).
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its determination that registration was a fair and reasonable
prerequisite for selling pesticides in this country, the Court did not list
the many "benefits" brandished by the Phillip Morris courts: rather,
the Court simply commented that plaintiffs could cease selling their
products in the United States and choose to sell them in foreign
markets only.13
Second, the Phillip Morris holdings contravene the public policy
considerations affirmed in Ruckelshaus, as well as both takings and
"fight-to-know" law jurisprudence. In Ruckelshaus, the Court
validated state use of broad regulatory power in cases like Penn
Central and especially Allard, another case involving commercial
transactions. The Ruckelshaus Court also followed Eddy and
National Fertilizer, rejecting challenges to public disclosure laws on
the grounds that the desire of manufacturers to keep trade secrets
secret was subject to the state's exercise of police power in the
interest of "fair dealing." '133 Since Ruckelshaus, other federal courts
have upheld public health right-to-know laws against takings
challenges."3 Despite this case history, however, the Phillip Morris II
court dismissed the value of public disclosure of commercial products,
characterizing it as conferring only a "marginal benefit in increased
public awareness' 135 and, as discussed above, ignoring the Nollan
rational relation test.
Finally, what is perhaps the most alarming aspect of the Phillip
Morris holdings is the creation of a vested right to sell tobacco
products in state markets, the alteration of which must be
compensated. This proposition is fundamentally inconsistent with
Penn Central, where the Court rejected as meritless petitioners' claim
that denial of a building permit entitled them to "payment of just
compensation."'36  The Phillip Morris courts went far beyond
132. Id. at 1007.
133. Eddy, 249 U.S. at 431-32.
134. In N.J. State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.J. 1985),
the court rejected a challenge to the New Jersey Worker and Community Right to Know
Act, which required employers to publicly reveal the presence of certain hazardous
chemicals. Citing Monsanto, the court noted that "as long as the employer is aware of the
conditions under which the data are submitted and as long as the conditions are rationally
related to a legitimate government interest, a submission under the Right to Know Act
does not constitute a taking." Id. at 628 (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007). In Mfrs.
Assn. of Tri-County v. Knepper, 801 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit upheld an
essentially identical challenge to the Pennsylvania Community Right to Know Act.
135. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21012, at ::-16-17 (D.
Mass. Dec. 10, 1997).
136. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
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affirming Ruckelshaus's finding that holders of trade secrets enjoy
Fifth Amendment protections, using the takings clause and a novel
interpretation of Ruckelshaus's benefit/burden paradigm to estop
Massachusetts from passing laws or regulations that alter the ways in
which the tobacco companies do business within the state. Indeed,
the courts expanded the property interest in trade secrets from the
basic right to exclude, and essentially placed a brand-new strand in
the bundle of trade secret property rights: the right to have a market
in which to sell one's property. This certainly contravenes
Ruckelshaus's explicit limitation of a trade secret holder's right to
exclude competitors, not consumers. And even if Nollan is
understood to stand for the proposition that a private landowner has
an affirmative right to develop and build upon their own property, the
parallel drawn by the Phillip Morris courts between the Nollans and
the tobacco companies remains unprecedented. Under the Phillip
Morris cases, not only do holders of trade secrets enjoy Fifth
Amendment protections and the right to do as they please with their
property, but also an apparent entitlement to have markets made
available to sell their products. According to Phillip Morris I, "The
ability to conduct (and, more especially, to continue to conduct) a
lawful business in Massachusetts... simply is not analogous either in
kind or in degree, to the benefit that effected the exchange and
extinguished the takings claim in Ruckelshaus."'37 The Phillip Morris
III court similarly rejected the contention that allowing the tobacco
companies to "continue to do what they had been doing without
burden before the enactment of the Disclosure Act"" was a benefit
conferred for compliance with the Act. In response to objections to
this unprecedented abridgment of the state's power to regulate
commercial transactions and dangerous products, the Phillip Morris
III court warned against "playing the 'police power' trump, '139 and
rejected the state's argument that "since Massachusetts law creates
the protection for trade secrets, Massachusetts may withdraw that
protection."' The Phillip Morris cases have profound public policy
implications because they conflate the right to alienate private
property with the right to alienate private property under preferable
conditions, limited perhaps only by conditions placed upon past
transactions. Millions of products are sold in this country, and the
137. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670,677 (1st Cir. 1998).
138. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129,144 (D. Mass. 2000).
139. IL at 143.
140. ILa at 144.
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state's ability to regulate the sale and distribution of those products
remains a valuable safeguard of the public welfare. The Allard
Court's conclusion that regulations in commercial transactions
impose burdens in order to "secure the advantage of living and doing
business in a civilized community" was quoted in Ruckelshaus, and
supports the proposition that no taking occurs when the government
"imposes new conditions on a pre-existing, lawful enterprise or even
bans a business altogether, where.., the regulation is a valid exercise
of the police power to protect the health or safety of the public.'
14'
Whether these regulations are enacted to abate nuisances' or control
local land uses,"4 it is absolutely essential that governments be given
discretion to make new laws and alter old ones. A consideration of
the alternative is instructive. The best case scenario would be the one
rejected by the Allard Court: "To require compensation in all such
circumstances would effectively compel the Government to regulate
by purchase."" And the worst-case scenario, of course, would simply
be the cessation or drastic reduction of governmental regulation in
the interest of public health and welfare. The Phillip Morris II court's
characterization of the right to consider selling tobacco products in
Massachusetts as not in and of itself being a benefit of "real value"'45
also raises serious questions about the types of benefits and privileges
corporations already enjoy in our communities, a subject beyond the
scope of this note.
Conclusion: The Troubling Legacy of the Phillip Morris Cases
In his critique of the Disclosure Act, Robert K. Hur suggests that
Massachusetts could have achieved its public health goals with more
narrowly tailored legislation.'46 However, it is worth noting that the
Phillip Morris opinions are not narrow in scope. In fact, Phillip
Morris III warns that any law allowing for any public disclosure of
any ingredients in tobacco products would fail in court: "A partial
disclosure would still be the disclosure of previously secret
141. Brief for Appellant at 44, supra note 124.
142. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928);
Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of
San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
143. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co v. City of New York, 260 U.S. 393 (1922): Agins v.
City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
144. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979).
145. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 159 F.3d 670,676 (1st Cir. 1998).
146. Hur, supra note 73, at 473.
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information in which the plaintiffs have a property interest.""
Limited to their facts, the Phillip Morris holdings are significant to
the future of tobacco regulation. Commonplace ingredients in
cigarettes include poisonous and carcinogenic substances such as
ammonia, cyanide, and butane. 8 The FDA has determined that
tobacco consumption is the leading single cause of preventable death
in the United States, with over 400,000 annual reported deaths from
tobacco-related illnesses.149 A government that cannot act to promote
public health in the face of these facts is unreasonably constrained
from performing its duties. However, the Phillip Morris holdings
place severe restrictions on the scope of actions that a government
might choose to undertake in furtherance of such a goal, precluding
even the most basic labeling requirements that apply to countless
other products sold on the market today.
The Phillip Morris holdings also provide a strong incentive for
other producers and manufacturers of commercial goods, especially
large, corporate plaintiffs, to contest public health and welfare laws
through takings challenges. Phillip Morris retools basic factors in
takings jurisprudence, prioritizing private property interests so much
that they render other considerations virtually nonexistent. By
simplifying takings law so that reasonable investment-backed
expectations are unilaterally defined by opponents of governmental
regulation, and essentially requiring a quid pro quo to validate
governmental regulations which alter existing market conditions in
commercial transactions, the Phillip Morris courts have surely helped
make the world a safer place to manufacture and sell hazardous
products.
147. Phillip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 113 F. Supp. 2d 129,140 n.27 (D. Mass. 2000).
148. Hur, supra note 73, at 473 (citations omitted).
149. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 127-28 (2000)
(citations omitted).
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